A new access control scheme for Facebook-style social networks by Pang, Jun & Zhang, Yang
A New Access Control Scheme for Facebook-style
Social Networks
Jun Pang∗†, Yang Zhang†
∗Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust, University of Luxembourg
†Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication, University of Luxembourg
Abstract—The popularity of online social networks (OSNs)
makes the protection of users’ private information an impor-
tant but scientifically challenging problem. In the literature,
relationship-based access control schemes have been proposed to
address this problem. However, with the dynamic developments of
OSNs, we identify new access control requirements which cannot
be fully captured by the current schemes. In this paper, we focus
on public information in OSNs and treat it as a new dimension
which users can use to regulate access to their resources. We
define a new OSN model containing users and their relationships
as well as public information. Based on this model, we introduce
a variant of hybrid logic for formulating access control policies. A
type of category relations among public information are exploited
to further improve our logic for its usage in practice. In addition,
we propose a few solutions to address the problem of information
reliability in OSNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) are among the most popular
web services during the past five years and have attracted
a huge amount of users all over the world. For example,
Facebook, the leading OSN service, has more than one billion
active users.1 OSNs are playing a great role in our daily life by
providing a platform for users to present themselves, articulate
their social circles, interact with each other etc.
With the large amount of data maintained in OSN websites,
privacy concerning users’ personal information inevitably be-
comes an important but scientifically challenging problem.
Access control schemes (e.g., see [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8]) are naturally introduced to protect users’ privacy in OSNs.
They can be used to guarantee that resources are accessible
by the intended users, but not by other (possibly malicious)
users. Typically, users can control the access to their own
information or resources with access control schemes supplied
by OSNs. The existing schemes, including the ones proposed
by the research community, are mainly relationship-based, i.e.,
whether a user is able to access the information depends on
the relationship between him and the owner, e.g., ‘friends’ or
‘friends of friends’.
Due to their own nature and the development of informa-
tion and communications technology, OSNs admit quick and
dynamic evolutions. Many new services and methods for user
interaction have emerged. For instance, users can play online
games with friends or find people who share similar interests.
More recently, with the increased popularity of GPS-enabled
1http://newsroom.fb.com/
mobile devices, OSNs have evolved into geo-social networks
– users can then tag posts and photos with their geographical
locations, find nearby friends and post check-in of some
places to share their comments. OSNs are also emerging as
important social media – people use OSNs to publish news,
organize events or even seek for emergent help. For example,
Facebook and Twitter play an extremely important role during
the rescue process for the “April 2011 Fukushima earthquake”.
(In Sect. III, we will take Facebook as a typical example and
discuss its developments in the past few years.)
With these evolutions, more information and activities of
users are made available in OSNs. As a result, new access con-
trol schemes are needed to capture these new developments.
Let us illustrate this need by a few scenarios in OSNs.
• Someone broke the window of Alice’s expensive car and
took her purse when she parked the car in the area of
Montparnasse in Paris. Alice publishes a status in the
OSN to see if anyone can provide her some clue to
find the purse back. She doesn’t want everyone to know
that she has an expensive car, and people who live in
other areas or cities won’t be able to give her any useful
information. Therefore, she intends to choose people who
live in the Montparnasse area as audiences of her status.
• Bob wants to organize a fundraising party for children’s
rare diseases. He doesn’t want to make this event public
as certain sensitive information of the participants can be
leaked, e.g., it is possible that some participants’ family
members may suffer from the disease. Instead, Bob only
wants people who are linked with a certain number of
charities (through donations, volunteering, etc) like him
to attend the party.
• Charlie has some friends who work at the rival company
of his own employer. These friends invited Charlie to
attend the party organized by their company. Charlie
publishes a photo taken at the party. Apparently, it is not
a good idea for his colleagues and boss to see this photo.
Thus Charlie wants no one but his friends who work at
this rival company to see it.
In relationship-based schemes, a resource owner cannot exploit
any other information but user relationships between him and
the requester when defining access control policies. Therefore,
the above requirements cannot be fully and precisely formu-
lated in the current schemes proposed in the literature.
Contributions and Outline. In order to solve the identified
problems, we propose a new access control scheme for OSNs.
We focus on public information existing, e.g., in Facebook
(Sect. III), and show that it can be used to group users based
on their attributes, common interests and activities. Public
information can thus be considered as a new dimension for
users to regulate access to their resources. As a consequence,
we propose a new OSN model containing both a user graph
and a public information graph (Sect. IV). We then develop
a hybrid logic to express this type of access control policies
(Sect. V). The expressiveness of our scheme is extensively
discussed through a number of real-life scenarios (Sect. VI).
We identify a special semantic relation, i.e., category relation,
among public information, which allows us to express a certain
type of policies in a concise way (Sect. VII). To address the
problem of information reliability in OSNs, we propose to add
endorsement and trust into our policy formulas (Sect. VIII).
After the introduction, we give a brief overview of related
work in Sect. II. We discuss several issues related to our
scheme in Sect. IX. Sect. X compares our access control
scheme with existing schemes in the literature. We conclude
our paper with some future work in Sect. XI.
II. RELATED WORK
Relationship-based access control, driven by OSNs, was first
advocated in [9] and defined as an access control paradigm
based on interpersonal relationships. Carminati et al. proposed
the first relationship-based access control model in [10], where
the relationships between the qualified requester and the owner
are interpreted into three aspects, i.e., relationship type, depth
and trust level. In [11], the authors used semantic web technol-
ogy including OWL and SWRL to extend the model of [10].
They also proposed administrative and filtering policies which
can be used for collaborative and supervising access control,
respectively. Fong et al. proposed an access control scheme for
Facebook-style social networks [12], in which they model the
access control procedure as two stages. In the first stage, the
requester has to find the owner of the target resource; then in
the second one, the owner decides whether the authorization is
granted or not. Their access control policies are mainly based
on the relationships between the requester and the owner.
Moreover, they proposed several meaningful access control
policies based on the graph structure of OSNs, such as n-
common friends and clique. In [13], Fong introduced a modal
logic to define access control policies for OSNs. Later Fong
and Siahaan [14] improved the previously proposed logic to
further support policies like n-common friends and clique.
In [15], the authors adopted a hybrid logic to describe policies
which eliminates an exponential penalty in expressing complex
relationships such as n-common friends. A visualization tool
for evaluating the effect of access control configurations is
designed in [16], with which a user can check what other users
within a certain distance to him can view his resources. Cheng
et al. proposed a rich OSN model in [17]. In their work, not
only users but also resources are treated as entities and actions
performed by users are considered as relationships in OSNs.
As more information are incorporated in their model, many
new access control policies can be expressed (more details
can be found in Sect. X). Their model supports administrative
and filtering policies as proposed in [11]. Besides models,
several security protocols based on cryptographic techniques
are proposed to enforce relationship-based access control
policies, e.g., see [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24].
As a shared platform, resources in OSNs may be co-owned
by a number of users. Thus, collaborative access control also
plays an essential role in protecting privacy. A game theoretical
method based on the Clarke-Tax mechanism for collective
privacy management was proposed by Siquicciarini et al. [25].
Sun et al. proposed a different approach by combining trust
relations in OSNs and preferential voting schemes [26]. Ahn
et al. introduced a multiparty access control model in [27].
In addition, they developed a policy specification scheme and
a voting based conflict resolution mechanism. Photo tagging
is the most common service relevant to collaborative access
control. The authors of [28], [29] have investigated users’
privacy concerns about this service and proposed principles for
designing better collaborative access control schemes. Besides
interaction, users’ private information can be leaked through
third party applications. A privacy-by-proxy design for social
network APIs was developed by Felt and Evans [30]. Singh et
al. [31] proposed a privacy-preserved application platform, i.e.,
xBook, which integrates information flow model to control
what applications can do with users’ information. An access
control scheme for third party applications was developed [32],
where applications are required to adapt users’ specifications
on their own data.
III. MOTIVATION
An OSN provides users with some typical services, such as
users can build their profiles and establish social relationships
with each other. Moreover, an OSN also provides a platform
for users to socialize and interact with each other. In the
following, we first give a brief overview of the developments
of Facebook – one of the most popular OSN services in the
world. After that, we discuss public information in Facebook
and its potential usage in access control.
Facebook. In Facebook, each user is affiliated with a personal
profile that contains his basic information (e.g., age and
gender), work and education background, living places and
so on. His hobbies are articulated in ‘Likes’; places he has
been to are marked in ‘Map’. A user can establish friend
relations with others. Moreover, he can organize his friends
into different groups, or named friend list.
Facebook is not only a website storing users’ personal
information and social relations, but also a platform for users
to interact with each other. A user can directly communicate
with his friends by messaging or ‘poking’; he can tag his
friends in photos and posts. Two friends can interact through
Facebook applications such as games. All activities performed
by a user are organized chronologically in his ‘Timeline’
through which other users as well as the user himself can check
his past activities conveniently. A user receives his friends’
news on ‘Newsfeed’. When he finds something interesting,
he can further perform actions, such as ‘like’, ‘share’ and
‘comment’, on it. Most recently, in January 2013, Facebook
publishes a new product called Graph Search, a search engine
based on users’ data. 2 Through Graph Search, a user can
directly acquire information from his friends’ data without
visiting their personal pages. For example, if a user types
in “photos by my friends”, he will get a page containing all
photos uploaded by his friends. For the same query, different
users will get different results.
A Facebook user regulates other users’ access to his re-
sources through an audience selector, which supports five
different modes, i.e., ‘public’, ‘friends’, ‘friends except ac-
quaintances’, ‘only me’ and ‘custom’. In the last mode, a
user can choose the eligible requester to be a single user or a
specific group (through friend list).
Public information and access control. Besides users, Face-
book imports knowledge of external sources, e.g., Wikipedia
and Bing map, into its system to formalize another type of
entities. We name them public information. A lot of entities
in the real world are modeled as public information, e.g., coun-
tries, history events or public figures. Public information are
mainly used as common reference points of users’ information,
through which a user can find other users in Facebook with
similar background, hobbies, experiences, etc. For example,
a user can find his schoolmates through the public information
of the college that he has attended.
Each public information is affiliated with a content that is
normally extracted from external sources. Similar to users,
public information are also connected with each other and
links among them are based on their contents. For example,
if Wikipedia articles of two charities are connected, then
their public information in Facebook are connected as well.
There exist many different links between users and public
information. Some of these connections are based on user
profiles, e.g., if a user specifies his employer in his profile, then
he is linked with this employer’s public information. Others
are computed by Facebook through mining users’ data. For
example, if a user posts a status labeled with a location, then
the user is connected with the location’s public information.
In addition to facilitate users’ interaction, it is possible to
use public information in expressing access control require-
ments. For example, in the first scenario as discussed in Sect. I,
the requester has to be linked to the location where the car was
parked; in the second one, the requester needs to be linked with
the owner through some charity organizations; in the third one,
the requester is asked to be connected with the owner through
not only a friendship but also their employers’ connection.
Here, the location, charities as well as companies can all be
modeled as public information in OSNs.
All the above access control requirements are meaningful
and in line with the recent developments of OSNs. However,
the current access control in Facebook as well as schemes
proposed in the literature mainly focus on relationships among
2https://www.facebook.com/about/graphsearch
users, public information are not taken into account. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose a new access control scheme, in
which policies can be expressed based on both users and public
information, and their relationships.
IV. A MODEL OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
Our OSN model contains information of (1) users and their
social relationships, (2) public information and their connec-
tions, and (3) links between users and public information. Pub-
lic information and users are essentially two different concepts
– public information are imported from external databases, and
they cannot perform actions and establish relationships with
each other as users; relationships among public information are
also extracted from external sources. Therefore, we treat public
information and users separately. We model an OSN as a tuple
(UG,PG, ρ, %). A user graph is denoted by UG, and it depicts
users and their relationships. A public information graph is
denoted by PG, which represents all public information and
connections among them. Two maps, i.e., ρ and %, store links
between users and public information.
User graph. The set U contains all users in an OSN. Each
user is affiliated with some basic information which are treated
as attributes of the user. We use UR = {α1, . . . , αm} to
denote a (finite) set of relationship types supported in the
OSN. The semantics of each relationship type can be defined
as αi ⊆ U × U . If user ua is in a αi relationship with
user ub, then we write (ua, ub) ∈ αi. For each relationship
type αi ∈ UR, there exists its reverse relationship type, e.g.,
if αi stands for husbandof , then its reverse is wifeof . We
use α−1i ∈ UR to denote the reverse of αi. Moreover, if
αi = α
−1
i , then αi is a symmetric relationship, e.g., friend
is a typical symmetric relationship. User graph UG is a
directed graph denoted as (U ,UE), where every user in the
OSN is a node and the set of edges, i.e., UE , is defined as
{(ua, ub, αi) | ua, ub ∈ Uand(ua, ub) ∈ αi}.
Public information graph. Similarly, we can define public
information graph. We use the set P to denote all public
information that are extracted from external databases, such
as Wikipedia and some geography databases. Each pub-
lic information fc has its own attributes. We use PR =
{β1, β2, . . . , β`} to denote a (finite) set of relationship types
on public information. Each relationship type βj can be se-
mantically defined as βj ⊆ P×P . If βj’s reverse relationship
type exists, it is denoted by β−1j . Public information graph
is formally denoted as PG = (P,PE), where P is the
set of nodes and PE is defined as {(fc, fd, βj) | fc, fd ∈
Pand(fc, fd) ∈ βj}.
Links between UG and PG. There are a lot of links between
users and public information. As the OSN is modeled as UG
and PG, we define two maps, i.e., ρ and %, between them to
describe their connections:
ρ : U → 2P and % : P → 2U .
For a user ua ∈ U , ρ(ua) is a subset of the nodes in PG that
are related to ua. The map ρ(ua) may contain a lot of different
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Fig. 1. A sample OSN model.
types of public information, such as museums, universities,
pop stars, etc, which are computed by the OSN with the
information that ua provides. For a public information fc ∈ P ,
%(fc) gives all the users in UG who have been involved in
activities or have information related to fc. How to compute
ρ and % is not the focus of this paper, we assume that ρ and
% always give us the right results.
An example. A sample OSN model is shown in Fig. 1, whose
left side is a UG and right side is a PG. Edges in the graph
with double arrows imply that the relationships are symmetric.
For example, Alice and Bob are friends; Company A and
Company B are rivals. The dash lines between users and public
information reflect the links between UG and PG, which are
formally captured by the two maps ρ and %.
V. A HYBRID LOGIC
In [15], a hybrid logic is used to define access control
policies for OSNs. We adopt their logic and additionally
introduce a new type of formulas ψ. With such formulas, we
can define policies based on information in PG. Moreover,
two new logic operators, i.e.,  and , are introduced to
connect formulas on UG and PG, respectively. In this way,
we can combine resources and their relations from both UG
and PG to specify new and expressive access control policies
(see examples in Sect. VI).
Syntax. The syntax of our hybrid logic is given below.
s ::= m | x
t ::= n | y
φ ::= s | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈αi〉φ | #sφ | Oxφ | ψ
ψ ::= t | q | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | 〈βj〉ψ |  tψ | Hyψ | φ
In our logic, there are mainly two types of formulas: the user
formulas φ manipulate information on the user graph UG,
while the public information formulas ψ are defined on PG.
Three kinds of atoms are supported in our logic, i.e., nominals
(m and n), variables (x and y) and proposition symbols (p
and q). Nominal m represents the name of a user in UG,
while n represents the name of a public information in PG.
Propositional symbol p is used for specifying the attributes
of users in U and similarly q is used for public information
in P . For example, p (i.e., IsMale) can specify users who are
male and q (i.e., IsPublicFigure) can specify those publication
information which are a public figure. Atoms m, x and p are
used in user formulas φ, while n, y and q are used in public
information formulas ψ. Negation ¬ and conjunction ∧ have
their usual meanings and can be used to define disjunction ∨.
Therefore, we also use ∨ in both φ and ψ. 〈αi〉 and 〈βj〉 are
two modal logic operators. As described in Sect. IV, symbols
αi and βj represent the relationship types in UG and PG,
respectively. Hybrid logic operator # can be used either with
a nominal or variable, while O can only operate on variables.
The same holds for  and H. Two new logic operators, i.e., and , are used to connect the two types of formulas φ
and ψ together.
Semantics. Our model for evaluating access control policy
formulas contains six parts, i.e., Γ,∆, ρ, %, cur n, τ , where
Γ = (UG, VU ) and ∆ = (PG, VP ). VU is a map between
atoms (either m or p) and users in UG, VU (m) is a set that
contains only one user in UG whose name is m and VU (p) is a
set of users that have the attribute as specified by p. Similarly,
we can define VP (n) and VP (q). As introduced in Sect. IV,
ρ and % maintained by the OSN connect users and public
information. Node cur n refers to either a user ua in UG or
a public information fc in PG. Valuation τ stores all the maps
from variables in the policy formula to vertices in either UG
or PG. When there is a new map from x to ua (y to fc) added
to τ , we write τ [x 7→ ua] (τ [y 7→ fc]).
We use satisfaction relation Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ to describe
the meaning of user formula φ.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  x iff ua = τ(x)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  m iff VU (m) = {ua}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  p iff ua ∈ VU (p)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  ¬φ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ 2 φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ1
and Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ2
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  〈αi〉φ iff ∃ub ∈ Us.t.(ua, ub) ∈ αi
and Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  #mφ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
where VU (m) = {ub}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  #xφ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, τ(x), τ  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  Oxφ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ [x 7→ ua]  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  ψ iff ∃fc ∈ ρ(ua)
s.t.Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ
The first three relations express the meaning of atoms. When
φ is a single variable x, it holds if and only if when τ contains
a map from x to ua. If φ is a single nominal or propositional
symbol, it is true if and only if when ua is in the set defined
by VU . When several modal logic operators (〈αi〉) are aligned
sequentially in a formula, they can represent a relationship
path, e.g., user can define a policy to regulate that only ‘friends
of friends’ can access his resource.
The hybrid logic operator #sφ jumps to the node that s
refers to in UG, and Oxφ adds a map from x to ua into τ .
The new operator, i.e., ψ, links a user formula φ with a
public information formula ψ – it maps the current node ua
in UG to a set of public information in PG that are related to
this user. If there is one public information in ρ(ua) satisfying
ψ, then the formula ψ holds.
In the following, we give the meaning of public information
formulas ψ.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  y iff fc = τ(y)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  n iff VP (n) = {fc}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  q iff fc ∈ VP (q)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ¬ψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ 2 ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ1
and Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ2
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  〈βj〉ψ iff ∃fd ∈ Ps.t.(fc, fd) ∈ βj
and Γ,∆, ρ, %, fd, τ  ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ   nψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fd, τ  ψ
where VP (n) = {fd}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ   yψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, τ(y), τ  ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  Hyψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ [y 7→ fc]  ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  φ iff ∃ua ∈ %(fc)
s.t.Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ
It is easy to find that the semantics of public information
formulas resembles the user formulas. Therefore, information
in PG can be used in access control policies in a same way as
in UG. When the evaluation process encounters the operatorφ, the public information node fc is mapped to users that
are related to it in UG. If φ holds at one of these users, then
the formula φ is true.
Note that, by combing the user formula ψ with propo-
sitions, we can link a user to a more specific set of public
information. We write qψ for (q∧ψ) and its meaning can
be reinterpreted as:
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  qψ iff ∃fc ∈ ρ(ua) ∩ VP (q)
s.t.Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ
Similarly, we can define pφ as (p ∧ φ) and formulate its
semantics.
Expressing policies. In general, there are four elements in an
access control scenario, i.e., a requester, a target, an action and
access control policies. More precisely, the requester tries to
perform an action on the target, whether he succeeds or not
depends on the access control policies defined for the target.
We use variable req to represent the requester. With multiple
services supported by the OSN, a target can be a user or a
resource. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the target
can only be a resource owned by some user. Normally, a user
can define an access control policy for the resources that he
owns. But in some cases, the access of a resource is decided
by several users – this is the subject of collaborative access
control management, e.g., see [17], [25], [26], [27], and is
out of the scope of our paper. We assume that a resource is
attached with only one access control policy that is defined
by its owner represented by the variable own. The only action
we consider is ‘view’, other actions, such as ‘comment’, ‘tag’
and ‘share’, are affiliated with it, i.e., when a user is able to
view a resource published by another user, he can comment or
share it as well.3 Thus, we ignore actions in the access control
policy. In OSNs, both the requester and the owner are users.
We restrict that an access control formula has to start with
either an owner or a requester, i.e., policy formulas are in the
form either #ownφ or #reqφ.
Model checking. Given an OSN model (UG,PG, ρ, %) and
an access control policy expressed in our hybrid logic as
a formula φ, the satisfaction of Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ with
τ [own 7→ ua, req 7→ ub], Γ = (UG, VU ) and ∆ = (PG, VP )
is formulated as a local model checking problem by Bruns
et al. [15]. Except for the user graph UG, our OSN model
captures public information and their relationships. Moreover,
our logic essentially extends the one of [15] with public
information formulas ψ defined on PG and two new operators and  connecting user formulas and public information
formulas. In principle, we can reuse the model checking algo-
rithm of Bruns et al. [15]. As formulas of the form ψ′ or φ′
explore the links between UG and PG, we need to treat them
differently. A formula ψ′ maps the current node (cur n) in
UG to a a set of public information in PG. As long as there
is one public information in ρ(cur n) satisfying ψ, then φ
holds. The formula φ′ is defined similarly. To check them,
we can develop a sub-routine similar to MCmay of Bruns et
al. [15], which first computes the set of all public information
3This is supported by Facebook.
(users) related to a specific user (public information) and then
iterate through the set until one of them makes the connected
formula ψ′ (φ′) hold on PG (UG). For formulas (q ∧ ψ′)
and (p ∧ φ′) as discussed in Sect. V, we can further reduce
the size of the computed set by using propositions p and q to
improve the efficiency in model checking.
VI. EXAMPLE POLICIES
In order to show the expressiveness of our new scheme
based on the OSN model, we design several real-life scenarios
and give their corresponding formulas in our logic. We use the
OSN model depicted in Fig. 1, and we assume that valuation g
contains two maps own 7→ uo and req 7→ ur, where uo, ur ∈
U are the owner and the requester, respectively.
Scenario 0. We first show how to express the policy related
to user relationships. Suppose that Eve defines a policy on a
certain resource to regulate that the qualified requesters can
only be her friends or friends of friends. The policy formula
can be written as follows:
#own(〈friend〉req ∨ 〈friend〉〈friend〉req).
The hybrid logic operator #own drives the formula to start
at Eve. The requirement “friends of friends” is achieved by
aligning 〈friend〉 twice which forms a relationship path of
length two. In Fig. 1, Bob, Frank and Gabriele can view the
resource because they are friends of Eve, Alice is also eligible
since she is one of Eve’s friends of friends.
Next, we illustrate the function of public information by
defining access control policies for the three scenarios men-
tioned in Sect. I. In the first scenario, public information are
used to describe an attribute of the qualified requester. While
in the second and third scenarios, the owner and the requester
are linked through public information. In addition, the third
scenario needs the owner and the requester to be connected
through the user relationship as well.
Scenario 1. Let us recall the first access control scenario
discussed in Sect. I, which exploits the information in PG.
Alice publishes a status to find a witness who lives in or visited
the area where her car was broken into, i.e., Montparnasse in
Fig. 1. The policy is formulated as
#req Montparnasse.
The operator  links UG with PG, as introduced in Sect. V,
we can use IsLocation to make the map more precisely.
Montparnasse in the formula is a nominal, VP (Montparnasse)
is the node that represents Montparnasse in PG. Here, the
requester’s connection with Montparnasse can be treated as
one of his attributes.
In order to get more information, Alice may enlarge the
searching area to the whole city, i.e., Paris in Fig. 1. We
assume that a user can only be linked to a place’s public in-
formation, but not to a city’s public information. For example,
a user’s photo can be labeled with any street or square of a
city, but not the city itself. The policy can then be written as
#req IsLocation 〈is-in〉Paris.
Here, 〈is-in〉 represents a 1-depth relationship path in PG.
Depending on the policy, the length of the path can be
arbitrary. Note that the requester’s connection with Paris can
be also formalized as an attribute. However, in this way, each
user will be affiliated with a huge number of attributes in the
model which may not be an ideal solution.
Scenario 2. In this scenario, Bob wants to use the OSN to
organize a fundraising party for children’s rare diseases. He
intends to let people who are affiliated with at least a certain
number, such as three, of different charities as himself to
access the event page. The policy is defined as follows.
#own IsCharity Hy1  (req∧#own IsCharity Hy2(¬y1 ∧(req∧#own IsCharity Hy3(¬y1 ∧ ¬y2 ∧req))))
The left part of Fig. 2 depicts an example of three charities
(‘UNICEF’, ‘Red Cross’ and ‘SOS Children’s Villages’) in
PG needed between a qualified requester and Bob. It can be
thought as a public information version of ‘3-common friends’
policy in UG. Three variables, i.e., y1, y2 and y3, mark three
charities that Bob is linked with; the conjunction of their
negative forms, i.e., ¬y1 and ¬y1∧¬y2, in the formula makes
sure that these three charities are different.
With our logic, more complicated policies can be achieved
based on the information of PG. Suppose that Bob wants to
organize another fundraising party for homeless children in
Syria during its current civil war. For security and privacy
reasons, he believes that the qualified requesters to attend
this event should be people who are linked with at least two
charities as he is, such as ‘UNICEF’ and ‘Red Cross’, that are
involved in the humanity aid in Syria organized by the United
Nations, i.e., ‘Unocha.Syria’ in PG,4. The policy is defined as
#own  Hy1〈donate〉Hy5(Unocha.Syria∧
〈donate−1〉Hy3  (req ∧#own  Hy2(¬y1 ∧ 〈donate〉(y5∧
〈donate−1〉Hy4(¬y3 ∧req )))))
The connections between the requester and Bob are shown in
the right part of Fig. 2. Variables y1 and y2 mark two different
charities; so do y3 and y4 for the requester. We notice that the
charities that Bob is related to need not to be different from
the ones of the requester. Variable y5 guarantees that all these
organizations have contributions to ‘Unocha.Syria’.
Since the public information and their relationships are
extracted from external sources, complicated relationship paths
in PG as shown in this example give rise to more meaningful
and expressive access control policies.
Scenario 3. In the third scenario in Sect.I, Charlie only allows
his friends who work in the rival company of his employer to
view his photo. The policy is formally defined as below:
#own(〈friend〉req ∧ (〈rival〉 req)).
Different from policies in the previous scenarios, this one
requires that the owner and the requester are linked through
4http://syria.unocha.org/
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Fig. 2. Connections between Bob and qualified requesters.
information in both UG and PG. More precisely, the sub-
formula 〈rival〉 regulates that the qualified requester need
to work for Company B’s rival, i.e., Company A; and the sub-
formula 〈friend〉 filters out the requester who is not a friend
of Charlie. We use a conjunction symbol to combine these two
parts. In Fig. 1, only Alice is qualified as she is a friend of
Charlie and she works for Company A.
VII. USING CATEGORY RELATION IN ACCESS CONTROL
The category relation in PG. Let us first consider another
scenario. In the model depicted in Fig. 1, Charlie is linked with
several kinds of sports including Basketball and Tennis. Alice
is also a sport fan and her favorite one is Tennis, while Danny
likes Volleyball. Charlie has a photo depicting him playing
tennis. He only wants his friends who are linked with Tennis
to view it. The policy can be defined as
#own〈friend〉(req ∧ (Tennis)).
Since Alice likes Tennis, she can view the photo. Now, Charlie
decides to relax the restriction such that the qualified requester
should be his friend who likes any kinds of sports. He modifies
his policy as follows:
#own〈friend〉(req ∧(〈is-a〉Sports)).
Relationship path 〈is-a〉 in the formula marks all the public
information that are in an is-a relation with Sports in PG, e.g.,
Tennis. However, this policy cannot achieve Charlie’s goal.
For example, Danny is not able to view this photo even he
is supposed to be. This is because Volleyball is not linked
with Sports but Team Sports in is-a relationship as shown
in Fig. 1. In order to grant access to Danny, Charlie again
modifies the policy as follows:
#own〈friend〉(req ∧(〈is-a〉Sports ∨ 〈is-a〉〈is-a〉Sports)).
However, there exists many public information related to
Sports in the OSN and defining a policy by enumerating all
possible lengths is not an acceptable solution. In Wikipedia,
articles are organized by means of categories. An article is
under (at least) one category, some article can be the main
article of a category. For example, article basketball is under
the category team sports, it is also the main article of the
category basketball. An article under a category is linked
with the category’s main article. Actually, this is the is-a
relationship among public information in PG, we call it
category relation. Since all categories of Wikipedia form an
acyclic group (category graph), public information together
with is-a relationships among them compose an acyclic graph
as well. For example, the subgraph in the dashed box in Fig. 1
is a tree. Next, we integrate the category relation into our logic
formula to express above policies in a concise way.
Logic with the category relation. In the model depicted in
Fig. 1, Charlie is linked with several kinds of sports including
Basketball and Tennis. Alice is also a sport fan and her favorite
one is Tennis, while Danny likes Volleyball. Charlie has a
photo that he wants to share with all his friends who like
sports. As depicted in the dash box of Fig. 1, these kind
of public information are organized by categories. Instead of
defining a policy to specify all the sports that are linked to
users, we can directly use these category information to define
policies.
To make use of the category relations among public infor-
mation, We first introduce a function on PG and a new symbol
in our logic. The function cf is formally defined as
cf({fc}) =
{ {fc} @fds.t.(fd, fc) ∈ is-a⋃
cf({fd}) ∀fd such that (fd, fc) ∈ is-a
The result of cf({fc}) contains fc and all its descendants in
an acyclic graph based on is-a relationships in PG.
In our hybrid logic, nominal n can represent name of any
public information in PG. In order to refer to the node named
n as well as all its descendants in the formula, we add a
category nominal bnc into our logic. The syntax of formulas
ψ is extended as follows:
ψ ::= t | bnc | q | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | 〈j〉ψ |  tψ | Hyψ | φ.
The semantics of bnc is
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  bnc iff fc ∈ cf(VP (n))
⋃
VP (n).
With the category nominal, Charlie can easily redefine his
policy in the previous example as
#own〈friend〉(req ∧bSportsc).
Now, all friends of Charlie who are related to any kind of sport
activities, such as Alice and Danny, can access the photo.
Similar to the ones with their contents from Wikipedia,
public information from geography databases, i.e., places,
together with is-in relationships among them also naturally
compose an acyclic graph. Therefore, we are able to define
policies to qualify the requester, such as “only my friends who
have ever been to Europe”, in a concise way without listing
different length of is-in relationship paths in PG. Other types
of hierarchical relationships on public information can also be
investigated for the same purpose.
VIII. INFORMATION RELIABILITY
Owners define policies to control access to their resources.
However, in some cases, if the information in OSNs are
not reliable, malicious users can still gain access to some
resources that they are not supposed to under certain policies.
For example, in Scenario 0 of Sect. VI, If an adversary is
able to become friends with three friends of Eve, then he is
able to gain the access. Similarly in Scenario 3 of Sect. VI, a
colleague of Charlie, who is also his friend, can maliciously
specify that he works for the rival company in the OSN to
access Charlie’s sensitive photo. As introduced in Sect. IV,
our OSN model contains three parts, i.e., UG, PG and two
maps ρ and %. We discuss about their reliability one by one.
Reliability of UG. Information contained in UG are mainly
users and their relationships. Since a user can describe who
he is in the OSN, we only focus on users relationships. To
increase user relationships’ reliability, we explore trust. In
contrast to the real life, trust between users in OSNs can be
quantified, i.e., it has a value. We first add trust values into UG.
When ua establishes an αi relationship with ub, ua will assign
a trust value tαiab to this relationship. The edge from ua to ub is
then defined as (ua, ub, αi, tαiab). Similarly, the edge from ub to
ua is (ub, ua, α−1i , t
α−1i
ba ). Note that t
αi
ab is only known to ua and
t
α−1i
ba is only known to ub, and these two values can be different.
We regulate that every trust value is in the interval [0, 1], the
bigger the value is, more trust it represents. We additionally
introduce two new operators 〈αi〉→tφ and 〈αi〉←tφ into the
user formula φ and their semantics are defined as follows.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  〈αi〉→tφ iff
∃ ub ∈ U s.t. (ua, ub) ∈ αi, tαiab ≥ t and
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  〈αi〉←tφ iff
∃ ub ∈ U s.t. (ub, ua) ∈ α−1i , tα
−1
i
ba ≥ t and
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
When the requester is regulated to be linked with the owner
through user relationships, trust can be put into the formula.
Now for the policy of Scenario 0, Eve can specify the formula
as below #own〈friend〉→0.83 req.
To get an illegal access with the above formula, a malicious
user needs to become friends with three users that Eve trusts
(t ≥ 0.8). Note that the way we integrate trust value into the
user formula is simple. There exist other methods, such as trust
value can be evaluated on a whole relationship path. How to
extend our logic to support complicated trust requirements is
part of our future work.
Reliability of PG. Different from users’ information, public
information are imported from external databases and they are
not operated by real users. For example, Paris’s information
in Facebook is taken from Wikipedia and the fact that it is
in France can be extracted from public geography database.
Therefore, reliability of public information are guaranteed
by these external sources – for instance, the reliability of
Wikipedia pages and their connections can be ensured by a
community effort and users’ reputation [33].
Reliability of ρ and %. Some public information result in
user relationships, for example, users who went to the same
school are ‘schoolmates’ or work in the same company are
‘colleagues’. If the link between the qualified requester and
this kind of public information are exploited by a policy, then
the owner who defines this policy can add the connection
originated by the public information between the qualified
requester and other users into the formula as well. In this
way, these other users can be treated as endorsing the con-
nection between the requester and the public information. In
Scenario 3 of Sect. VI, besides working in the rival company,
Charlie regulates that the qualified requester should have a
certain number, e.g., 3, of colleagues who work in this rival
company. Moreover, he can also add trust to the formula. The
policy is defined as follows.
#own(〈friend〉→0.8req
∧ (〈rival〉Hy  (req ∧ 〈colleague〉←0.73  y))).
Now, in order to gain the access, the malicious user has to be
trusted by Charlie (t ≥ 0.8) and be colleagues with three other
users who work in that company. Also, these three colleagues’
trust value on the requester have to be at least 0.7. Clearly, it
is much harder for the adversary to succeed.
For policies exploiting public information that cannot result
in user relationships, endorsement (as well as trust) cannot be
applied. For example, in Scenario 1 of Sect. VI, the qualified
requester needs to be linked to a location, while in Scenario 2
Bob and the requester are connected through charities. Similar
to public information, the reliability of the links between some
of these public information and users also depends on external
services. For example, in Facebook, a user is treated as having
been to one location if he used to publish a status or photo
labeled with that location. This location label is provided by
ISP (Internet Service Provider) or GPS services. A user’s
connection to a charity can be certified by the charity, as the
user normally gets tax benefit for his donations. Again, we do
not focus on the reliability of external services.
IX. DISCUSSION
We have shown that our scheme can express fine-grained
access control policies related to users and public informa-
tion. We have also shown how to deal with the problem of
information reliability in OSNs by incorporating endorsement
and trust into our policy formulas. There are still two other
issues to discuss.
The first question is about the usability of our scheme,
especially for the non-experienced users – whether a user
can easily express a policy of his intention. On one hand,
relationship-based policies (e.g., friends, friends of friends)
can be easily expressed in our scheme like the current access
control schemes adopted by OSNs. On the other hand, a group
of qualified requesters under a sophisticated policy can be
computed by OSNs, e.g., a Facebook user can directly get
a list of his friends who have been worked in a company
through Graph Search. Therefore, we believe that our scheme
can be supported as well. Moreover, users can use visualization
tools (e.g., see [34]) to learn whether their policies have been
properly enforced.
The second is related to the availability of user information
in OSNs. As privacy raises serious concerns in OSNs, users
might not be willing to share too much information. As a
consequence, some eligible users can be filtered out by a policy
due to the lack of their information in the OSN. However, one
purpose of OSNs is for people to express themselves – more
information a user shares, more benefits he will gain from
the OSN. In another way, a user keeps more privacy if he
shares less information. There is always a balance between
information sharing and privacy. What we focus in this paper
is to explore the information shared by users in OSNs to
express fine-grained access control policies. Availability of
user information in OSNs is thus orthogonal to our proposal.
X. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our scheme with relationship-
based access control schemes in the literature [15], [11], [17]
(see Table I).
The model of OSNs in [15] is the same as our user graph
UG, but public information are not treated as entities in the
model. As a consequence, access control policies only make
use of users’ social representations. On the other hand, it
seems possible to express connections between users and
public information through propositions in [15]. For example,
a proposition IsinParis can be used to express the connection
between a user and Paris. However, as mentioned in Sect. VI,
each user will be affiliated with a large amount of attributes
which is neither ideal or practical. Moreover, policies that ex-
plore relationships between public information (see examples
in Sect. VI), cannot be captured by propositions.
The work proposed in [11] does not explicitly take into
account public information and their relationships. However,
this work has two interesting features. First, in the OSN
model, users’ resources are treated as independent entities.
Relationships between users and resources are not restricted
only to ownership, e.g., the relationship between a user and a
photo that he is tagged in is modeled as ‘photoOf’ in their
language. Thus, collaborative access control is possible in
their model. Second, due to the fact that OSNs are modeled
with semantic web technologies, hierarchy information among
users’ relationships are naturally supported as well as ac-
tions and resources, which make policy propagation possible.
For example, if a user defines a policy to regulate the qualified
requester to be his friends, then users who are in a closer
relationship, such as ‘good friend’, with him are also qualified.
In our work, we have used semantic relations among the public
information in Sect. VII to facilitate users to express their
policies concisely.
Similarly, the scheme in [17] does not take into account
public information neither. In this model, attributes of users are
not represented. Moreover, their policy language seems weaker
than ours – negation symbol only works with relationship
paths, but not on nodes. Hence, policies such as “all my
friends but Alice can view my photo” cannot be expressed.
On the other hand, this work has some features that our model
cannot support. First, the OSN model treats resources as nodes
which is similar to the one in [11], and actions that users
performed on their resources are recognized as relationships.
For example, a user can regulate that only users who used
to comment on a same photo as he did is able to poke
him. Second, the authors propose a simple solution through
administrative policies for collaborative access control. To
achieve this in our model, we need to add a decision module
in the model checking algorithm.
We notice that the two schemes [11], [17] can potentially
treat public information as users’ resources, i.e., modeled
as nodes in their OSN model. However, as we explained
in Sect. IV, public information are extracted from external
databases, and relationships among them are different from
the ones between users. In our work, we apply the separation
of concerns principle to model public information and their
relationships separately from users and their social links.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have first identified a new type of
access control policies that are meaningful but have never
been addressed in the literature. Namely, users in OSNs can
express access control requirements not only based on their
social relations but also on their connections through public
information. Then we defined an OSN model containing users
and public information, based on which we proposed a hybrid
logic to define access control policies. We gave a number
of policies based on public information and formulated them
formally and precisely in our proposed logic. We further used
category relations among public information to extend our
logic and make it more practical. In addition, we also showed
how to extend our model and logic to deal with unreliable
information in OSNs.
We plan to extend our work in several directions. First, we
want to improve the expressiveness of our model by integrating
user resources [11], [17]. As resources are different from users,
modeling resources explicitly may address more expressive
policies. Second, policy propagations can be supported in
our model by defining hierarchies among users’ relationships.
Third, it is interesting to develop privacy-preserving protocols
for access control enforcement in our scheme.
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